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 Abstract 
 
In this paper, we focus on two barriers to entry that may hinder the formation of new 
firms: capital requirements and regulatory business cost. The contribution of this 
paper is twofold: we compare the availability of different types of financing sources to 
address the issue of capital requirement and we utilise a new measure of business cost 
by constructing a composite index using data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Database. Using cross-sectional data on 37 countries that participated in the 2002 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, we examine the effect of availability of financing 
and regulatory business costs on the propensity of three different types of 
entrepreneurial activity: opportunity-driven, necessity driven and high-growth 
potential new firm formation. The availability of three types of financing sources is 
analysed: traditional debt financing, venture capital financing, and informal 
investments. The findings show that only informal investments significantly influence 
the propensity to be entrepreneurs. Regulatory business costs were found to deter 
opportunity driven entrepreneurship, but had no impact on other types of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Keywords: entrepreneurial activity, financing, venture capital, informal investment, 
business cost 
 
JEL Codes: L000, L110, M130 1. Introduction 
 
In examining the determinants of entrepreneurial propensity, the entrepreneurship 
literature is rich in studies that have focused on the psychological and demographic 
characteristics of individual business founders. More recently, researchers such as 
Specht (1993) have moved from the “traits” approach, to adopt a “rates” approach that 
focuses on factors that influence organisational formation at a more aggregated 
industry or national level. In this paper, we examine two such environmental factors 
that may act as entry barriers and negatively influence the rate of new firm creation in 
an economy: capital requirements and regulatory business cost. We study the 
influence of capital requirements by analysing the availability of financing sources 
that might ameliorate the problem of high capital requirements faced by 
entrepreneurs. This is in line with the GEM Conceptual Model that posits financial 
support and low market barriers as important factors in explaining what makes a 
country entrepreneurial (Reynolds et al., 2000).  
 
Our choice to study capital requirements and regulatory costs is motivated by studies 
at the industry, firm and individual levels that have found these two factors to be 
important in deterring entry. Economists such as Bain (1956) and Stigler (1968) 
argued that incumbent firms enjoy absolute cost advantages over potential new 
entrants, having established economies of scale in capital-intensive processes. Few 
entrepreneurs are capable of acquiring the large amounts of capital required to enter 
markets at the minimum efficient scale and to operate competitively. In this way, 
capital requirements discourage the entry of new firms. In the strategic management 
literature, Michael Porter (1980) proposed six major sources of barriers, including 
capital requirements and government policies, the latter involving regulatory 
requirements for licences and permits for formation of new businesses.  
 
Empirical studies have supported the hypotheses proposed by economic theory and 
Porter’s (1980) framework.  White (1982) found that the existence of small firms is 
negatively related to capital intensity. Studying entry rates of small firms of different 
sizes, Acs and Audretsch (1989) concluded that capital intensity in an industry serves 
as an entry barrier for small firms with fewer than 100 employees. Using data on 382 
US manufacturing industries in 1977, and defining capital requirements as per Bain 
(1956), Dean and Meyer (1996) found that capital requirement significantly deterred 
new venture formation. Analysing executive perceptions at 49 Fortune 500 
companies, Karakaya and Stahl (1989) found empirical support for Porter’s concepts, 
although they acknowledged that these findings can only be generalised to larger 
firms. The deterrent effect of government-imposed costs on entrepreneurial intention 
has been observed in countries such as Peru (de Soto, 1989), Japan (Japanese 
Association of Small Business, 1999) and Russia (Huskey, 2005). 
 
The other aspect of capital requirements as an entry barrier is access to capital. 
Surveys of individuals have found that liquidity constraints limit the entrepreneurial 
choice behaviour of individuals who may wish to switch to self-employment (Evans 
and Jovanovic, 1989; Bates, 1995). In a study on individuals who have developed 
business ideas but decided against launching new ventures, Van Auken (1999) found 
that financial constraints was the most significant obstacle standing in the way of 
business launch. 
 The contribution of this paper is twofold: we compare the availability of different 
types of financing sources to address the issue of access to capital and we utilise a 
new measure of regulatory business cost by constructing a composite index using data 
from the World Bank’s Doing Business Database. In the next section, we present an 
overview of the literature on various financing sources and regulatory business costs 
and their role in entrepreneurial venture formation. The research questions and 
hypotheses investigated are developed in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the 
methodology, data and analysis methods employed in this paper. Results from the 
analysis are presented in Section 5, with a discussion section following in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Availability of Financing and Entrepreneurship 
 
In the entrepreneurship literature, the importance of capital to new ventures is well 
accepted. The probability of individuals becoming entrepreneurs is found to increase 
with their assets-size (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Holtz et al., 1994). As a determinant 
of firm formation, capital is important because it influences not only the ability of 
firms to enter into markets, but also their performance post-entry. Empirical studies 
on new ventures have established that sufficiency and size of initial capital resources 
boost the ability of new firms to survive (Bruderl et al., 1992), earn higher profits 
(Duchesneau and Gartner, 1990) and grow (Bamford et al., 1999).  
 
Koch (1974) stated that “… there may exist capital requirements that discourage entry 
of new firms”, positioning financing requirements as a potential entry barrier. In a 
review of studies in the economics literature on the determinants of firm entry, 
Geroski (1995) arrived at a stylised result that capital-raising requirements are 
important barriers to entry. Capital requirements act as entry barriers because 
entrepreneurs are usually liquidity constrained, as found by Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989). The resources required to form a new firm are usually beyond the means of 
individual entrepreneurs (Bhave, 1994). Entrepreneurs therefore look to external 
sources of financing to overcome the entry barrier of capital requirement.  
 
2.1.1 Financial Munificence 
 
In the theoretical literature, the contribution of external financing sources to firm 
creation has been examined by researchers adopting a resource dependence view of 
organisations. Resource dependence theory proposes that organisations are dependent 
on the environment for external resources and information. The degree to which such 
resources are abundant or scarce is described as environmental munificence 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991). By conceptualising how resources within an environment 
influence the survival and growth of incumbent firms, Randolph and Dess (1984) 
suggested that environmental resources also affect the ability of new firms to enter 
that environment. In her proposed model of environmental factors explaining firm 
formation rates, Specht (1993) delineated five categories of munificence, including 
economic munificence. The theoretical work of researchers in the fields of 
organisational ecology (Aldrich, 1990) and organisational theory (Gartner, 1985) has 
also identified financial sources as determinants of firm formation. These conceptual 
postulations were empirically supported by Pennings’ (1980, 1982a, 1982b) studies of organisation birth rates that found that areas with greater availability of financial 
resources exhibited higher frequencies of organisational formation.  
 
These findings suggest that the availability of suitable financing sources would lower 
the barrier of capital requirement and facilitate entry into markets and industries, 
hence increasing the level of entrepreneurship In the literature, several alternative 
sources of external funding for new and small businesses have been analysed, most 
often in the context of the financing life cycles of firms (Scholtens, 1999, Carey et al., 
1993). While insider funding is generally thought to be the main source of financing 
in the earliest stage of venture formation, funding sources such as banks, venture 
capitalists and informal investors are believed to play important roles during the start-
up and expansion stages. 
 
2.1.2 Debt Financing by Banks and Financial Institutions 
 
Research on debt financing of new firms has been hampered by difficulty in obtaining 
data on funds raised by new firms from banks and other financial institutions. While 
certain regulated institutions such as commercial banks maintain records of loans to 
businesses, such data are typically not broken down by the size or age of the 
borrower. This situation has changed in the more advanced countries in recent years, 
in particular in the US, with the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending (STBL), bank call 
reports (CALL) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) providing data to 
researchers. 
 
Drawing on data from the US National Survey of Small Business Finances, Berger 
and Udell (1998) described the financing structure of “infant” businesses (aged below 
2 years) in USA as comprising 47.9% equity financing, of which the bulk is internal 
finance, and 52.1% debt financing, of which 27.8% was funding from financial 
institutions. Next to internal equity, loans from commercial banks formed the single 
largest source of financing for new and young firms in the USA. Unfortunately, the 
paucity of equivalent data outside the USA, particularly in developing nations, has 
meant that the applicability of this conclusion to other countries cannot be verified. 
 
In the context of new ventures, entrepreneurs may be driven to seek alternatives to 
financial institutions because the nature of new ventures presents difficulties for 
entrepreneurs to obtain financing from traditional bank and debt financing. As new 
firms lack tangible assets that may be pledged as collateral, banks financing might not 
be available to them (Berger and Udell, 2004). Empirical work by Brewer and Genay 
(1994) has shown that external private debt is more likely to be used to finance 
tangible assets, while venture capital finance is more likely to be used to finance 
intangible assets, such as those that would be owned by new firms. 
 
Entrepreneurs may also lack track record and the ability to signal their abilities and 
potential to potential financiers. Information asymmetries between the entrepreneur 
and financial institutions give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems that 
necessitate monitoring costs to be incurred by the financial institutions (Diamond, 
1991; Repullo and Suarez, 2000). 
 
2.1.3 Venture Capital 
 One notable feature of the financing of new ventures has been the increasing role of 
Venture Capital (VC), particularly in the US and in Europe.  Looking at data from the 
European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA), Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen (2003) found that total VC funds and investments had gone up significantly 
since the 1990s. The increasing role of VCs in USA was illustrated by Gompers and 
Lerner (2001) through the growing share of VC-backed firms in IPOs. 
 
VC investments have received substantive treatment in the literature, as surveyed by 
Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2001). From early on, 
Venture Capital availability was proposed and recognised as contributing to firm 
formation, as determined by Bruno and Tyebjee (1982) in a review of 17 papers on 
environmental factors influencing venture creation.  VC firms are seen as having an 
edge over banks as a source of finance for new firms, especially specialised 
technology-based firms. VC firms are active investors with entrepreneurial experience 
and industry knowledge that both entrepreneurs and banks may lack. They are able to 
participate actively and contribute to the management of portfolio companies, 
bringing with them not only capital, but also expertise and access to networks and 
markets. Compared to banks, VCs are able to finance new ventures with higher risks, 
as they offer hands-on business advice to enhance survival rates of their portfolio 
companies. 
 
However, VC funds typically incur high transaction costs. Gifford (1997) shows that 
this restricts the number of portfolio companies that VC firms can optimally evaluate, 
invest in and monitor. The minimum invested sum is corresponding high and beyond 
the reach of many smaller start-ups (BVCA, 2003 and Sohl, 1999 show figures for 
average size of VC investments in the UK and USA). Therefore, the number of 
businesses that can be funded by VCs is limited.  
 
As several studies have estimated, total formal venture capital investment is only a 
fraction of total informal investment (Harrison and Mason, 1992; Reynolds et. al., 
2002). It is a received consensus in the literature that most entrepreneurs use informal 
sources of funding, especially from family members (Zimmer and Aldrich, 1987). 
Amongst new firms that raised external equity capital, most raised it from angel 
investors as opposed to institutional Venture Capitalists (Fenn and Liang, 1998). In a 
study looking specifically at Business Angels (excluding the family and friends 
components of informal investments), Mason and Harrison (2000) estimated total 
angel investment to equal the amount of institutional VC funding in the UK. 
However, eight times as many businesses raise funds from business angels compared 
to VC firms.  
 
2.1.4 Business Angel Investments 
 
Business Angel investments, and the broader class of Informal investments, have 
received significant attention in the literature in the wake of Wetzel’s (1982, 1983) 
groundbreaking studies of business angels in the US. Since those pioneering works, 
the importance of angel investment as a source of finance for new business ventures 
has become well-established in the entrepreneurship literature (Robinson and 
Onasbrugge, 2000; Mason and Harrison, 2000; Harrison and Mason, 1999).  Business 
angel investments fill the financing gap between family and friends and the stage at 
which VC funds becomes a viable option for the new firm. Business angels are also likely to have entrepreneurial experience and are able to contribute to the firms they 
invest in. 
 
Two studies using GEM data have found that informal investment contributes to the 
level of entrepreneurial activity in countries. Bygrave et al. (2002) found that annual 
informal investment as a percentage of GDP contributes significantly to explaining 
the rate of opportunity-driven entrepreneurial activity across different countries. 
Using the percentage of adults who have made informal investments as the measure of 
informal investment intensity, Autio et al. (2003) found that informal investments had 
significant positive impact on opportunity-driven entrepreneurship as well as 
entrepreneurial activities with high growth potential. 
 
2.1.5 Deciding between Different Financing Choices 
 
There are two broad theoretical principles underlying the financing choices of 
businesses, taking into account both explicit and implicit costs of finance. The static 
trade-off choice framework describes several factors, including costs of exposure to 
bankruptcy (Harris and Raviv, 1991) and agency costs associated with the use of debt 
financing (Myers, 1977). In the pecking-order theory of capital structure choice, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that risks associated with information asymmetries 
between the firm and potential financiers will result in different expected return rates 
by financiers and a pecking order of external financing sources preferred by the firm. 
 
Cassar (2004) pointed out that several aspects of the financing choices are unique to 
start-ups and new ventures. Their newness and smaller scale would make some 
financing options unavailable and they are also more likely to be subject to context 
and individual-specific issues. Entrepreneurial ventures are also informationally 
opaque due to their limited track-record and are therefore likely to be more heavily 
reliant on initial insider finance (Berger and Udell, 1998). As such, in studying the 
financing options of start-ups, many factors other than the direct cost of funds may 
influence the financing decisions of both financier and entrepreneur. Furthermore, for 
the purposes of empirical research, it is difficult to obtain cross-sectional data on 
interest rates levied on small enterprises or new ventures. The complexities of the 
financing choice decision for start-ups indicate that the effect of different funding 
sources on entrepreneurial propensity is not uniform. A deeper understanding of the 
role of financing in venture formation would involve distinguishing and comparing 
different forms of funding.  
 
2.2 Regulatory Business Costs as Entry Barriers to Entrepreneurship 
 
The literature on industrial organisation and strategic management has established that 
a number of factors can deter potential new ventures from being formed despite the 
existence of market opportunities (see Gilbert (1989) for a survey). Empirical studies 
such as those by Harrigan (1981) and Dean and Meyer (1996) found that high entry 
barriers deter new venture entry. As reviewed by Siegfriend and Evans (1994), the use 
of multiple approaches and measures of entry barriers in prior empirical studies has 
led to some disagreement on which types of entry barriers are the strongest deterrent. 
Nevertheless, there is consensus that the extent of entry barriers will relate negatively 
to the extent of new firm formation. Gilbert (1989) explains that barriers to entry grant 
incumbent firms an asymmetrical advantage in serving a market and this can act to exclude new entrants. An earlier study by Gorecki (1975) showed that this incumbent 
advantage has greater impact on new firm formations than on diversifying firms. 
 
The issue of regulatory entry barriers has received relatively limited treatment in the 
empirical literature on firm formation rates, with most attention given to entry barriers 
such as product differentiation, capital requirements and economies of scale, as 
reviewed by Robinson and McDougall (2001).  However, regulation of entry is 
recognised as a barrier to entry. Porter (1980) proposed that government regulation 
may impose entry barriers to potential new ventures. Karakaya and Stahl (1989) listed 
a number of studies, primarily in the economics literature, that have considered 
government regulations as barriers to entry. Regulatory and procedural requirements 
entail business costs to be incurred by entrepreneurs, in terms of financial outlay 
and/or time consumed. Prohibitive costs may deter potential entrepreneurs (Japan 
Association of Small Business, 1999) or drive them into the informal economy 
(Djankov et al., 2002), hampering their ability to grow and contribute to economic 
growth due to lack of proper access to social, legal and business infrastructures. 
 
Cross-country analysis of the link between regulatory business costs and 
entrepreneurship has been hampered in the past by lack of a consistent measure for 
business cost. Djankov et al. (2002), following the work of de Soto (1990) developed 
a methodology to construct internationally comparable measures on the regulatory 
cost of starting a business. Using this methodology, the World Bank has constructed 
the Doing Business Database with business cost data from 145 economies. 
 
Four measures are used by the World Bank (2004) to capture various aspects of the 
registration process for new ventures in a country, measuring the cost of a starting a 
business. The four measures are: the number of procedures involved in the process, 
the number of days associated with the procedures, the official costs associated with 
the procedures and the minimum capital required before the registration process starts. 
The number of procedures describes the number of external parties, usually 
government-related, that the entrepreneur faces before his new business is registered. 
For many less developed economies, a higher number of procedures present greater 
opportunities for bribes to change hands, according to the tollbooth view of the public 
choice theory (McChesney, 1987 and De Soto, 1990).  
 
The business cost indicators constructed by the World Bank apply to limited-liability 
companies, and not to sole proprietors, partnerships, cooperatives or corporations. It is 
argued that limited liability companies are the most prevalent business form and the 
most desirable for economic reasons. Limited liability companies are the most likely 
to attract investors because potential losses are limited to the invested capital. 
 
The World Bank (2004) report provides descriptive analysis of the regulatory cost of 
starting a business globally and examines the socio-economic effects of high 
regulatory costs in terms of business growth, labour conditions, corruption and 
political rights of citizens. The World Bank did not attempt to correlate regulatory 
costs with the rate of firm formation. However, the report cited two countries, Austria 
and Vietnam, in which the rate of business creation increased after laws were passed 
to eliminate registration-related costs and procedures. In addition, the report found 
that richer countries have less burdensome regulatory costs while the OECD group of 
countries regulated the least compared to other regional groupings. Describing studies by Betrand and Kramarz (2002) and Alesina et al. (2003), the report showed that high 
regulatory business cost had adverse impact on employment growth and private 
investments in several developed countries. These findings suggest that such business 
costs may have stemmed the formation of entrepreneurial firms, leading to weakened 
economic performance in these economies. 
 
3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
In this paper, we investigate the influence of availability of financing sources and 
regulatory business costs on national level entrepreneurial propensity, across a panel 
of countries participating in the GEM 2002 study. To measure the national level of 
entrepreneurial propensity, we use the consistent and internationally comparable 
measures of entrepreneurship developed by GEM, the Total Entrepreneurship Activity 
(TEA) rates.  
 
Specifically, we seek to establish if the availability of financing and business costs 
have different effects on three sub-types of TEA rates measuring different types of 
entrepreneurial activity: opportunity-driven, necessity driven and high-growth 
potential TEA. Opportunity and Necessity TEA rates differentiate between 
entrepreneurs that are motivated to pursue perceived business opportunities and those 
that are driven to become entrepreneurs as a last resort, when other options for 
economic activity are absent or unsatisfactory. High-potential Growth TEA rate 
identifies the sub-set of entrepreneurs that are involved in businesses that have “high 
growth potential”. 
 
Previous literature on the relationship between entry barriers, availability of financing  
and rates of firm formation has typically viewed entrepreneurship as opportunity-
driven. Entrepreneurship is seen as arising from entrepreneurial opportunities which 
exist because of asymmetric beliefs about the value of resources (Kirzner, 1997). In 
attempting to construct an integrating framework for entrepreneurship, Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) highlight the emphasis on opportunity in entrepreneurship 
research by defining entrepreneurship as an examination of opportunities to create 
future goods and services. By looking at necessity driven entrepreneurial propensity 
and contrasting its determinants with those of opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, 
we hope to gain insights into the role played by entrepreneurial opportunities in start-
up and firm formation activities. 
 
High-growth potential TEA is of particular interest because research has shown that 
not all new firms contribute equally to economic growth. Kirchhoff (1994), Storey 
(1994), Westhead and Cowling (1995) and Birch et al. (1997) maintain that it is 
rapidly growing firms, rather than small firms in general, that generate the vast 
majority of new jobs. Using cross-country GEM data, Wong et al. (2005a) 
demonstrated that High-growth potential TEA was the only type of entrepreneurial 
activity that significantly influenced economic growth rates. The task of identifying 
such high-growth potential firms is daunting because they typically represent less than 
5% of new firms formed. The 2002 round of the GEM survey incorporated questions 
that could be used to identify individuals involved in high growth potential new 
ventures and start-up attempts. Rather than analysing firms that have already achieved 
high growth, Autio et al. (2003) explain that it is of greater interest to examine ex-ante 
firms that have the potential for growth. The ambitions and growth expectations of entrepreneurs are a likely antecedent to achieving future high performance. The high-
growth potential TEA rate is derived by operationalising these expectations along four 
characteristics: 1) potential for employment growth, 2) market impact, 3) globalised 
customer base and 4) use of new technology, where all four criteria must be fulfilled
1. 
  
3.1 Availability of Financing Sources 
 
Following the prediction of resource dependence theory that greater environmental 
munificence would lead to higher rates of firm formation (Castrogiovanni, 1991, 
Specht, 1993), we expect that the availability of external financing in an economy 
would be a significant determinant of entrepreneurial propensity.  As earlier 
discussed, the empirical and theoretical literature reports mixed findings on the 
different forms on financing and their role in venture formation. While debt financing 
is a major source of funding, at least in the US, information asymmetries render it 
unavailable to many entrepreneurs who lack tangible assets or sufficient track record 
(Berger and Udell, 2004). On the other hand, the characteristics of new firms, such as 
low-scale potential, may limit the applicability of financing from venture capitalists, 
who have been found to invest large amounts in a small number of firms (BVCA, 
2003; Sohl, 1999). In general, total VC investments tend to be only a fraction of the 
investments made by informal investors (Reynolds et al., 2002) and the venture 
capital industry is also undeveloped in many countries.  
  
These prior findings indicate that the different forms of financing do not have a 
uniform impact on entrepreneurial propensity. The nature of new ventures as well as 
the characteristics of the funding sources might limit the impact of certain forms of 
financing. As such, to more accurately test the hypothesis on the impact of financial 
munificence, we have distinguished three common forms of financing – traditional 
debt financing, informal investment and venture capital. 
  
H1a: Countries with higher availability of Informal Investors will exhibit higher 
levels of entrepreneurial propensity 
H1b: Countries with higher availability of VC fund investments will exhibit higher 
levels of entrepreneurial propensity 
H1c: Countries with higher availability of debt financing will exhibit higher levels of 
entrepreneurial propensity 
 
We expect that certain forms of financing would have stronger effect on 
entrepreneurial propensity than others. However, previous empirical evidence is not 
conclusive on the relative magnitude of the influence exercised by specific financing 
sources. Many studies have focused on a single financing form, such as VC or 
informal investments, and did not compare across different types of financing. 
Furthermore, as critiqued by Cassar (2004), the majority of empirical investigations 
into financing of new firms have been on limited geographic and industry focus. By 
examining the relative size of the standardised estimated coefficients from our 
analysis, we will attempt to compare the relative contributions of three major 




 3.2 Business Costs 
 
We posit that business costs have significant negative impact on entrepreneurial 
propensity, but only for Opportunity Driven entrepreneurship. As argued by Dean and 
Meyer (1996), entry barriers act as constraints on exploitation of opportunities by new 
ventures in a framework where new ventures are driven by demand determinant. The 
exploitation of opportunities requires the entrepreneur to judge that expected 
entrepreneurial profits would more than compensate for opportunity costs of other 
alternatives (including loss of leisure and income security), lack of liquidity and a 
premium for bearing uncertainty (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Kirzner, 1973). 
Entry barriers such as regulatory business costs raise the required expected returns 
from entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 
Necessity entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are driven to self employment by the 
absence of alternative employment, creating the “refugee” effect described by 
Audretsch (2001). While necessity entrepreneurs may well exploit opportunities, this 
is not the main motivation. Hence, the decision process of necessity entrepreneurs 
places less weight on assessing the expected value of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Additionally, the opportunity cost of alternative employment and income is zero for 
necessity entrepreneurs, except in the case of countries with social security safety-
nets, which we will address in the next hypothesis. When entrepreneurial activity is a 
last resort due to lack of alternative means of earnings, we would expect that business 
cost would have no deterrent effect. 
 
H2a: Countries with higher regulatory business costs will exhibit lower levels of 
Opportunity driven entrepreneurial propensity 
H2b: Regulatory business costs will not significantly differentiate between countries 
with high and low levels of Necessity-driven entrepreneurial propensity 
 
When categorising entrepreneurship as opportunity versus necessity driven, we have 
implicitly viewed entrepreneurship in the context of occupational choice or preference 
(Shmitz, 1989), with necessity entrepreneurship representing an extreme of zero 
choice. When examining the issue of entry barriers, it is important to also consider the 
effect of national income level as this dictates the opportunity costs of alternatives to 
entrepreneurship and influences the employment versus entrepreneurship decision. In 
wealthier countries, the opportunity cost of lost employment is higher as income 
levels for paid employment are higher. Additionally, in many wealthier countries, 
social security systems are in place to provide safety-nets for the unemployed. In the 
presence of high opportunity costs, the existence of entry barriers in such countries 
would have a stronger deterrent effect on potential entrepreneurs, both opportunity 
and necessity-driven. Conversely, in low income nations where jobs are scarce and 
social security systems are inadequate, the opportunity costs are low and entry barriers 
will have weaker or no effect on entrepreneurial propensity. We posit, therefore, that 
the deterrent effect of regulatory business costs on both Opportunity and Necessity 
TEA rates depends on the wealth level of the nation. 
 
H3a: The impact of regulatory business cost on Opportunity driven entrepreneurial 
propensity will be more negative in higher income countries.  
H3b: The impact of regulatory business cost on Necessity driven entrepreneurial 
propensity will be more negative in higher income countries.   
The degree to which business costs would deter the formation of new businesses is 
inversely related to the expected value of entrepreneurial opportunities. Research has 
shown that entrepreneurs are more  likely to exploit opportunities with higher returns 
such as when profit margins are higher (Dunne et al., 1988) or when the technology 
life cycle is young (Utterback, 1994).  The greater the expected value of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, the lower would be the deterrent effect of entry barriers, 
as returns are expected to more than compensate the costs imposed by these barriers. 
For activities which are driven by entrepreneurial opportunities with very high 
expected values, we would expect that regulatory business cost would not have any 
deterrent effect. In our present analysis, High-growth Potential TEA captures this 
element of entrepreneurial opportunities with high expected values. Therefore, we 
posit that business costs would have no significant impact on high-growth potential 
entrepreneurial propensity across countries. 
 
H4: Regulatory business costs will not significantly differentiate between countries 




These hypotheses are tested using multiple linear regression on a sample of countries 
that participated in the GEM 2002 study. In total, there are 37 countries in the sample. 
However, due to missing data in certain countries for VC investments and Business 




4.1 Data Sources 
 
The main data source used for analysis is the harmonised country-level GEM 2002 
dataset. This comprises entrepreneurship propensity data on 37 countries, aggregated 
from large-sample adult population surveys in participating countries. The list of 37 
countries is given in Appendix Table A1. Additionally, the GEM project also included 
face-to-face interviews with around 35 expert informants in each country. These 
expert informants completed a short standardised questionnaire in which they 
assessed the environment for entrepreneurship in their respective countries, along nine 
dimensions as specified in the GEM conceptual model. These assessments are also 
summarised in the country-level dataset. Reynolds et al. (2005) provides a detailed 
explanation of the GEM design and implementation process for data collection. 
 
Data on Venture Capital investments are collated by the co-ordinators of GEM from 
various national sources such as the Australian Venture Capital Journal, British 
Venture Capital Association, Canadian Venture Capital Association, European 
Venture Capital Association and the National Venture Capital Association (US). 
Participating GEM countries submitted Venture Capital data from national sources, 
where available, to the GEM coordinators.  
 
Data on Business Cost are obtained from the World Bank Doing Business Database 
(World Bank, 2004), constructed using the methodology developed by Djankov et al. 
(2002). The World Bank database provides details on four measures of regulatory business costs for starting new businesses: number of procedures to start a business, 
number of days to start a business, cost of starting a business and minimum paid up 
capital required to register a business. The monetary cost measures are standardised as 
percentages of per capita income in order to be comparable across countries. 
 
4.2 Estimation Model 
 




National Entrepreneurial Propensity = f (control variables … Availability of Debt 
Finance, Availability of Informal Investment, 
Availability of Venture Capital, Regulatory 
Business Cost) 
 
Below, we describe the measures and data source for each of the variables in the 
model. The correlation coefficients between the variables are presented in Appendix 
A2. 
 
National Entrepreneurial Propensity is the dependent variable and is measured using 
the TEA rates computed from the GEM 2002 dataset. High Potential TEA, Necessity 
TEA, Opportunity TEA and overall TEA rates are alternated as the measures of 
entrepreneurship used in the dependent variable. TEA rates for 2002 are used because 
of the larger number of cases, 37, and because that is the first year for which data 
were collected to compute the High Potential TEA index. 
 
There are two control variables used to control for different economic conditions in 
the cross section of GEM countries. As the number of observations is limited, we 
have been parsimonious in our choice of control variables. Additional variables, such 
as ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP and trade to GDP ratio, were also tested and 
excluded as they were not statistically significant. 
 
Rate of Productivity Growth controls for different stage of economic development.
2 
This is measured using the growth in GDP per employed person over a 5-year period. 
Growth rate is computed by taking the average of annual compound growth rates 
between 1997/98 and 2001/02. Average growth over a 5-year period is used to smooth 
out temporal fluctuations in annual growth rates. GDP data are obtained from the 
World Economic Outlook by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data on 
employed persons are from Euromonitor Global Market Information Database 
(GMID), compiled from national sources. 
 
GDP per employed person controls for different wealth levels in the sample of 
countries. GDP per employed person for the year 2002 is used and data are obtained 
from the World Economic Outlook by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Euromonitor Global Market Information Database (GMID), compiled from national 
sources. 
 
There are three independent variables related to the availability of different sources of 
financing for new firms:  
Availability of Debt Finance is measured using the GEM expert informants’ 
assessment of whether “there is enough debt funding for new and growing firms” in 
each country. This is rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 equals “strongly disagree” and 
5 equals “strongly agree”. The responses from all expert informants in a country are 
aggregated and averaged. The average score in each country serves as a proxy of debt 
financing availability in the country. 
 
Availability of Informal Investors is measured as the proportion of the adult 
population in the country who had in the past 3 years personally provided funds for a 
new business started by someone else, excluding the purchase of publicly traded 
shares or mutual funds. Data on informal investors are obtained from the GEM 2002 
database.  
 
Availability of Venture Capital is measured as the dollar value of domestic 
institutional VC investments as a percentage of GDP in 2002. Data for this are 
collated by GEM, using VC data compiled by national sources in each country. 
 
We acknowledge that the inconsistent measurement of the three funding sources is a 
shortcoming of the dataset. While it would have been preferable to measure 
availability of debt funding in terms of total value of loans to new ventures, such data 
are unavailable for most countries.  
 
The other independent variable is Regulatory Business Cost, as measured by 
regulation of the registration process for new businesses: 
 
Regulatory Business Cost is measured using a composite index of the four World 
Bank (2004) measures of government imposed business costs associated with starting 
a business: number of procedures to start a business, number of days to start a 
business, cost of starting a business and minimum paid up capital required to register 
a business. The index is constructed by firstly standardising the individual measures to 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The composite Business Cost index is 
computed as the equal-weighted average of these 4 standardised measures. 
 
Regulatory Business Cost data from the World Bank Doing Business database are 
benchmarked to the year 2004. While it would have been ideal to use business cost 
data for the year 2002 to be consistent with other variables, this was not possible as 
World Bank had not collected such data for prior years. Djankov et al. (2003) had 
collected data on number, cost and length of procedures for the year 2002 but data on 
minimum capital requirement are not available across all countries for this earlier 
period. In the interest of having a more complete measure of regulatory business cost, 
we have used the 2004 data from the World Bank, where minimum capital 
requirement is included.  However, we envisage that this incongruence in the period 
of measurement would have little impact on the findings as regulatory procedures and 




Because data on VC investments are only available for 30 countries, the degrees of 
freedom for regression analysis are restricted. Additionally, three countries did not have expert informant data on availability of debt financing, reducing the effective 
sample size to 28 countries, if all variables are included. As such, we have estimated 
the regression equation in two stages. In the first stage, we include the three 
alternative sources of finance to determine their levels of significance as determinants 
of entrepreneurship propensity.  
 
TEA = α + β1 Productivity Growth + β2 GDP/worker + β3 Availability of Informal 
Investors + β4 VC/GDP +  β5 Availaibity of Debt Financing 
 
In the second stage, we add the World Bank Business Cost index as an independent 
variable, together with the variables on financing sources which were found to be 
significant in the first stage.  The interaction term, Regulatory Business Cost * 
GDP/worker, is included to assess if the impact of business cost on entrepreneurial 
propensity is contingent on the income level of the country
3. The unmodified 
interaction term resulted in high multicollinearity between the interaction term and its 
component variables. To eliminate this problem, the GDP/worker construct was 
centred to mean before the interaction term was computed. 
 
TEA = α + β1 Productivity Growth + β2 GDP/worker  
+ β3 (Significant Finance Variable(s)) + β4 Regulatory Business Cost  
+ β5 (Regulatory Business Cost * GDP/worker) 
 
In all regression equations estimated, multicollinearity diagnostics are generated to 
detect for potential problems. All reported results do not exhibit significant 





The equation constructed for hypothesis testing is estimated using linear least squares 
regression, alternating four different TEA indices as the dependent variable. While we 
show the results for Overall TEA for completeness, it is noted that this is a composite 
of Opportunity and Necessity TEA rates. As these two TEA indices yield very 
different results when analysed individually, it is difficult to directly interpret the 
results for Overall TEA. 
 
The signs and significance of the control variables are as expected. GDP per worker is 
significant and negative for Opportunity TEA and Necessity TEA. This is consistent 
with the fact that there are more entrepreneurial opportunities in developing countries 
as well as higher levels of unemployment leading to the “refugee” effect of necessity 
entrepreneurship. In contrast, GDP per worker is positive but insignificant for High-
growth Potential TEA, suggesting that the prevalence of high-growth entrepreneurial 
opportunities is not dependent on national wealth.  The growth in GDP per worker is 
significant and negative only for Necessity TEA. This is expected as necessity-driven 
entrepreneurs tend to possess fewer endowments of human capital and entrepreneurial 
capability, as argued by Lucas (1978), and are less likely to sustain new business 
venture that will contribute to growth.  
 
 
 5.1 Availability of Financing Sources 
 
The results for comparing the impact of three different sources of financing are 
presented in Table 1 below. The sample size for this first regression is 28 countries. 
Standardised coefficients are reported in order to compare the relative contribution of 
each predictor to explaining the dependent variable. The findings support only 
Hypothesis  H1a that the prevalence of informal investors would lead to greater 
entrepreneurial propensity. This was found to be positive and significant for all types 
of TEA except for necessity TEA. Institutional VC investment and Availability of 
Debt Financing were both found to be insignificant for all types of entrepreneurship.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Because the constructs for the three financing sources are measured on different 
scales, we proceed with caution to compare the standardised coefficients on these 
three predictors. We observe that the estimated standardised coefficient value on the 
Informal Investor predictor is consistently higher that the values for both the VC and 
Debt Financing predictor.  In the case of Opportunity TEA, the coefficient on VC is 
marginally lower than that for Debt Financing, but both were statistically 
insignificant.  Keeping the measurement caveat in mind, these findings suggest that 
the availability of Informal Investors is a stronger influence on entrepreneurial 
propensity than the other two funding sources. This appears consistent with evidence 
from previous studies, estimating that total informal capital investment is multiple 
times that of formal venture capital (Harrison and Mason, 1992; Reynolds et. al., 
2002) and that informal capital funds a greater number of new firms than formal 
venture capital (Mason and Harrison, 2000). Studies also show that formal sources of 
funding such as banks and VC firms are not as important in explaining firm formation 
rates (Hart and Denison, 1987).  
 
 
5.2 Regulatory Business Costs 
 
In the second stage of the regression analysis, we include the World Bank composite 
index of regulatory business cost as an independent variable, retaining only the 
financing variable, namely Informal Investors that was found to be significant in the 
first stage. Omitting both the VC and Debt Financing variables, for which data were 
missing in several countries, the sample size for this regression is increased to 36 
countries. The results are shown in Table 2 below. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
As postulated in Hypotheses H3a, regulatory business cost has a negative and 
significant impact on Opportunity TEA. As expected, Regulatory Business Cost had 
no significant deterrent effect on necessity-driven entrepreneurship, supporting 
Hypothesis H2b. 
 
We found the interaction term Regulatory Business Cost * GDP/ worker to be 
significant and negative for both Opportunity and Necessity TEA. This confirms 
Hypotheses H3a and H3b. The negative impact of regulatory cost is more pronounced 
in higher income nations. In the case of Opportunity TEA, this means that the deterrent effect of regulatory business cost is augmented in higher income nations, as 
the Business Cost variable in itself was significant and negative. In the case of 
Necessity TEA, the significance of the interaction term, while the Business Cost term 
itself was not significant, suggests that regulatory business costs only affects the rate 
of necessity entrepreneurship in higher income countries. 
 
Finally, the coefficient on Regulatory Business Cost is negative but insignificant for 
High-growth Potential TEA. This suggests that High-growth Potential TEA arises 
through the exploitation of opportunities that have sufficiently high expected value to 
negate the deterrent effects of regulatory business costs. 
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In general, the findings support the importance of financial munificence to new 
venture formation, but of three major forms of financing tested, only Informal 
Investment Availability contributes significantly to entrepreneurial propensity. 
Informal Investment Availability is particularly important as a determinant of High 
Growth Potential and Opportunity entrepreneurship. Conversely availability of debt 
financing and classic VC were found to be insignificant for these two types of 
entrepreneurship. As several studies that have estimated that total informal capital 
investment is multiple times that of formal venture capital (Harrison and Mason, 
1992; Reynolds et. al., 2002), this finding confirms the importance of informal 
investment relative to other forms of financing.  
 
While VC investment was found to not significantly explain national level 
entrepreneurial propensity, this does not undermine the importance of VC investment 
in funding new ventures. VC investments are relatively small in number and are 
typically concentrated in selective high-technology industries, especially the IT sector, 
where the role of VC is particularly crucial. While the impact of VC on general levels 
of entrepreneurship is negligible, it is possible that this would not be the case when 
conducting industry-specific analysis. 
 
The insignificance of the Debt Financing predictor appears to support the theoretical 
literature that information asymmetries present moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, limiting the access of entrepreneurs to financing from financial institutions. 
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution due to the perception-based 
construct for the availability of debt financing.  
 
Regulatory business cost was found to have a deterrent effect on entrepreneurial 
activities that are Opportunity-driven. In contrast, regulatory business cost was found 
to have no impact on the Necessity-driven entrepreneurial propensity. This is 
consistent with the view of entry barriers as deterrents that negate entrepreneurship 
driven by “pull” or “demand” factors characterised by market opportunities (Porter, 
1987; Dean and Meyers, 1996). Additionally, we found that the impact of business 
cost is dependent on the income level of countries. Specifically, in more developed 
countries, regulatory business cost has a more pronounced negative effect on 
Opportunity driven entrepreneurial propensity and becomes a deterrent even for 
Necessity-driven entrepreneurship.  
 As High-Growth Potential and Opportunity entrepreneurship are the most desirable 
forms of entrepreneurial activities, these findings underline the importance of 
encouraging business angel investment and reforming regulations for business entry. 
Maula et al. (2005) and Wong et al. (2005b) have found that the propensity to make 
informal or angel investments increases significantly if individuals are themselves 
entrepreneurs or personally know other entrepreneurs. This serves to underscore the 
importance of supporting widespread grass-root participation in entrepreneurial start-
up attempts.  
 
Entry barriers erected by regulatory business costs significantly impede the formation 
of new ventures, more so in developed nations than lower income countries. The 
World Bank (2004) has emphasized the need for administrative and regulatory 
reforms, particularly focusing on developing economies. Our findings suggest that 
there is also a need to reduce regulatory costs in advanced countries, where the 
deterrent effects of such costs appears to be more strongly felt. Several higher income 
countries in our sample have relatively high capital requirements. Japan requires 
minimum capital that is 75% of GDP per capita, while Denmark and Germany have 
requirements that are close to 50% of GDP per capita. It is suggested that 
comprehensive reform of regulatory costs would eliminate this minimum capital 
requirement to have zero requirement, as already practised in the US, UK, Hong 
Kong, Canada and Singapore, amongst others. 
 
The prevalence of High-growth Potential entrepreneurial activity is not affected by the 
presence of regulatory business costs. This suggests that High-growth potential 
entrepreneurship arises from exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities with very 
high expected values. Supply constraints such as business costs have no effect on this 
type of entrepreneurial activity. While our analysis has been limited to one form of 
supply constraint, and has not explored supply-side barriers such as bankruptcy 
legislation and compliance costs, this does present some preliminary evidence that 
High-growth potential TEA is truly opportunity-driven and supports the public policy 
focus in many developed countries to promote technology and knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship that exhibit high growth and high job creation rates (Shreyer, 2000; 
OECD, 1998). 
 
                                                 
1 The full definition of a high-potential innovative start-up attempt in the GEM dataset is a venture that 
fulfils all of the following criteria:  (1) the venture plans to employ at least 20 employees in 5 years; (2) 
the venture indicates at least some market creation impact; (3) at least 25% of the customers of the 
venture normally live abroad; and (4) the technologies employed by the venture had not been widely 
available more than a year ago. 
 
2 We also used growth in GDP per capita as an indicator of economic growth. The results were found to 
be largely similar. 
 
3 In the interest of completeness, we also included an interaction term Informal Investment * GDP/ 
worker. This was found to be not significant and its inclusion did not significantly alter the results of 
the analysis. References 
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High Growth Potential 
TEA  Opportunity TEA  Necess
   Value Sig.  Value Sig.  Value 
Ad R sq  0.193     0.420     0.488 
F  2.291 0.081  4.907 0.004  6.144 
                 
  
Std. 
Beta  Sig. Std.  Beta  Sig.  Std. 
Beta 
Control                
(Constant) t=0.308  0.761  t=-0.688  0.498  t=1.989 
Average compound growth in real GDP per 
employed person 1997-2002  0.097 0.598  -0.148  0.346  -0.067 
GDP per employed person 2002  0.174  0.378  -0.363**  0.038  -0.654** 
Predictors          
Informal Investors as % of Adult Pop 2002  0.520**  0.009  0.616**  0.001 0.117 
Classic VC as % of GDP 2002  0.071 0.691  0.193 0.213  0.102 
Availability of Debt Financing -0.049  0.798  0.236  0.159  -0.195 
 
** significant at 5% 
 Sample Size = 28 (30 countries with VC data excluding Italy and Poland, which did 
not have expert informant’s data on debt financing)Table 2: Influence of Availability of Financing Sources and Regulatory Business 




High Growth Potential 
TEA  Opportunity TEA  Necess
   Value Sig.  Value Sig.  Value 
Ad R sq  0.334     0.469     0.695 
F  4.403 0.004  7.000 0.000  16.488 
                 
  
Std. 
Beta  Sig. Std.  Beta  Sig.  Std. 
Beta 
Control         
(Constant)  t=0.550 0.587  t=2.108 0.044  t=2.831 
Average compound growth in real GDP per 
employed person 1997-2002  0.211 0.190  -0.207  0.150  -0.300** 
GDP per employed person 2002  0.006  0.977  -0.479**  0.011  -0.623** 
Predictors         
Informal Investors as % of Adult Pop 2002  0.537**  0.001  0.584**  0.000 0.146 
World Bank Index of Regulatory Business Cost -0.148  0.545  -0.449**  0.046 0.037 
World Bank Index of Regulatory Business Cost 
X GDP per employed person (interaction term)  0.266 0.186  -0.414**  0.025  -0.487** 
 
** significant at 5% 
 
Sample Size = 36 (all countries, excluding Iceland which did not have regulatory 
business cost data in the World Bank Doing Business database)Appendix A1: List of Countries in GEM 2002 Survey 
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of GDP per 
cap) 
ARGENTINA 14.15  7.13  6.77  0.44  2.05 .  15  32 15.7 8.1 
AUSTRALIA 8.68  1.53  6.69  1.46  1.81  0.10  2  2 2.1 0 
BELGIUM 2.99  0.31  2.35  0.64  1.73 0.06  4  34  11.3  14.1 
BRAZIL 13.53  7.50  5.78  0.25  0.62 .  17 152  11.7  0 
CHINESE TAIPEI 
(TAIWAN)  4.27 0.71  3.33  0.89  3.74 .  8  48  6.3  224.7 
CANADA 8.82  1.10  7.36  1.67  3.17 0.41  2  3  1  0 
CHILE 15.68  6.74  8.53  2.93  4.02 0.18  9  27  10  0 
CHINA 12.34  6.97  5.61  1.22  4.99 0.01  12  41  14.5 1104.2 
CROATIA 3.62  0.85  2.18  0.65  1.41 0.02  12  49  14.4  24.4 
DENMARK 6.53  0.43  5.90  0.96  3.37 0.14  4  4  0  48.8 
FINLAND 4.56  0.33  4.10  0.72  2.99 0.12  3  14  1.2  29.3 
FRANCE 3.20  0.09  2.84  0.57  1.23  0.08  7  8 1.1 0 
GERMANY 5.16  1.15  3.92  1.47  3.36 0.09  9  45  5.9  48.8 
HONG KONG  3.44  1.19  2.25  0.50  3.42 0.21  5  11  3.4  0 
HUNGARY 6.64  2.11  4.00  0.76  2.2 0.05  6  52  22.9 86.4 
ICELAND 11.32  0.92  8.62  3.97  7.48 0.14  .  .  .  . 
INDIA 17.88  5.04  12.42  0.04  2.89 .  11  89 49.5  0 
IRELAND 9.14  1.38  7.77  1.52  3.25 0.10  4  24  10.3  0 
ISRAEL 7.06  1.40  5.22  1.14  1.51 0.73  5  34  5.5  0 
ITALY 5.90  0.53  3.34  0.71  1.43 0.07  9  13  16.2  11.2 
JAPAN 1.81  0.51  1.24  0.16  0.63 0.04  11  31  10.6  74.9 
KOREA 14.52  4.12  8.55  2.11  5.02 0.97  12  22  17.7  332   Entrepreneurial Propensity  Financing  Regulatory Cost of Business 


























of GDP per 
cap) 
MEXICO 12.40  2.70  8.28  0.31  6.15 .  8  58 16.7  15.5 
NEW ZEALAND  14.01  2.25  11.57  3.15  4.46 0.04  2  12  0.2  0 
NETHERLANDS 4.62  0.50  4.03  0.73  1.83 0.16  7  11  13.2  66.2 
NORWAY 8.69  0.37  7.42  1.25  5.09 0.10  4  23  2.9  28.9 
POLAND 4.44  1.27  2.84  0.19  0.57 0.03  10  31  20.6 237.9 
RUSSIA 2.52  0.56  1.90  0.12  1.42 .  9  36  6.7 5.6 
SOUTH AFRICA  6.54  2.38  3.30  0.00  3.19 0.07  9  38  9.1  0 
SINGAPORE 5.91  0.86  4.94  1.33  3.61  0.36  7  8 1.2 0 
SLOVENIA 4.63  1.37  3.26  1.51  2.53  0.02  10  61 12.3 19 
SPAIN 4.59  1.02  3.42  0.64  3.11 0.13  6  108  16.5  16.9 
SWEDEN 4.00  0.67  3.33  0.63  2.84 0.31  3  16  0.7  36.9 
SWITZERLAND 7.13  0.87  6.03 1.07  3.83 0.03  6  20  8.6  33.2 
THAILAND 18.90  3.35  15.31  0.70  5.28 .  8  33  6.7  0 
UNITED 
KINGDOM  5.37 0.69  4.38  0.99  1.69 0.09  6  18  0.9  0 
UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA  10.51 1.15  9.11 0.81  4.93  0.40  5  5 0.6 0 
 Appendix A2:  Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables in Estimation Equation 
 
  1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 
1)  High-growth  Potential  TEA  1.000          
2)  Opportunity  TEA  0.401**  1.000         
3)  Necessity  TEA  0.059  0.429**  1.000        
4)  Overall  TEA  0.335**  0.908**  0.753**  1.000       
5) Average compound growth in real GDP per 
employed person 1997-2002  0.130 0.023 0.064 0.035 1.000         
6) GDP per employed person 2002  0.150  -0.228  -0.714**  -0.487**  -0.211  1.000     
7) Informal Investors as % of Adult Pop 2002  0.558**  0.612**  0.122  0.516**  0.141  0.030 1.000     
8) Classic VC as % of GDP 2002  0.182 0.324 0.152 0.341  -0.024  -0.019 0.217 1.000   
9) Availability of Debt Financing -0.012  0.037  -0.463**  -0.202  0.071  0.382** -0.062  -0.058  1.000 
10) World Bank Index of Business Cost  -0.300  0.019  0.658**  0.326  0.278  -0.673** -0.083  -0.090 -0.396** 
 
** significant at 5% 